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ABSTRACT
In an environment in which bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, an individual firm
may find bribes helpful to reduce the effective red tape it faces. The "efficient grease" hypothesis
asserts therefore that corruption can improve economic efficiency and that fighting bribery would
be counter-productive. This need not be the case. In a general equilibrium in which regulatory
burden and delay can be endogenously chosen by rent-seeking bureaucrats, the effective (not just
nominal) red tape and bribery may be positively correlated across firms.
Using data from three worldwide firm-level surveys, we examine the relationship between
bribe payment, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and cost of capital. Contrary to the
"efficient grease" theory, we find that firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not
less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of
capital.
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United States' Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA)
of 1977 has made it a crime for American
firms to bribe foreign government officials.In December 1997, the OECD membercountries signed
a convention that alsocriminalizes bribery of foreign officials by firmsfrom the member countries'.
Would laws of this kind reduce the incidenceof bribery by multinational firms? Do they promote
economic efficiency?
Over thirty years ago, rather elegantly,the respected political scientist SamuelP. Huntington
stated that "...in terms of economic growth,the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-
centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is onewith a rigid, over-centralized and honestbureaucracy."
(1968, p. 386) To paraphrase,excessive taxes and regulation on the books (nominalred tape) would
remain excessive without bribery; but with the possibilityof bribery, they may be transformed toless
"real" red tape (i.e., officials not enforcingall the rules and regulations in exchangefor bribes). In
other words, bribery is tantamount to de-regulation.
That view has not been an exception, and politicalscientists have not been alone over the past
three decades in pointing out that, ethicalconsiderations aside, corruption may in fact improve
efficiency, particularly in developingcountries. Indeed, theories that see someeconomic efficiency
virtues in corruption have been published by somewell-respected scholars in academic journals.
Nathaniel H. Leff (1964, p. 11) stated in unequivocal terms,
"...if the government has erred in its
decision, the course made possible by corruption maywell be the better one." A rigorouseconomic
model published in the Journal of Political Economy(Lui, 1985) demonstrated the efficiency-
enhancing role of corruption: in a queuingmodel, the size of bribes by differenteconomic agents
could reflect their different opportunity cost. Betterfirms are more able/willing to buy lowereffective
red tape. Hence, like an auction, a license or contractawarded on the basis of bribe size couldachieve
Pareto-optimal allocation.
We label the theory that bribery leads tolower effective red tape as the "efficient grease"
'The OECD Convention on Combating Bnbeiy of ForeignPublic Officials in International Business Transactions.
It went into effect in Februaiy, 1999, after ithad been ratified by a suflicient number ofindividual parliaments of the
signatory countries.2
hypothesis.If bribes "grease the wheels of commerce,"then campaigns by governments or
international organizations to combat corruption ininternational arena, such as the U.S. FCPA or the
OECD anti-bribery convention, would be counter-productive.We argue that this "efficient grease"
theory rests on a crucial assumption thatshould not be taken for granted. The assumptionis that the
red tape/regulatory burden (tax, licenses, delay,and so on) can be taken as exogenous, independent
of the incentive for officials to take bribes. Becauseof the assumption, the theory is partial
equilibrium in nature, and may not holdin a general equilibrium.
This point is not new. In sharp contrast to the viewsof Huntington, Leff and others at the time,
Myrdal in his epic Asian Drama (1968) suggestedalready a possible perverse relationship between
bureaucratic regulations and bribery. More recently Baneijee (1997)has formalized certain aspects
of that relationship, while Bardhan (1997) in hisexcellent survey paper on corruption (1997), states:
"In the second-best case made above, it is usually presumedthat a given set of
distortions are mitigated or circumvented by the effects ofcorruption; but quite often these
distortions and corruption are caused or at least preserved oraggravated by the same factors.
The distortions are not exogenous to the system and areinstead often part of the built-in corrupt
practices of a patron-client political system."
There is already a considerable literature on the consequencesof corruption. On theoretical
ground, Susan Rose-Ackerman (1974 and 1978),Shleifer and Vishny (1993 and 1994), and Bliss and
Di TeIla (1997), among others, have modeled problemsof corruption. In particular, Shleifer and
Vishny also make the point that a country's regulatoryburden may be endogenously exploited by
corruption-prone officials for the purpose of extractingbribes. We extend their argument one step
further, arguing that even within a country, becausethe bureaucrats have discretionary power with
a given regulation, corruption-proneofficials can often "customize" the nature and amountof
harassment on firms to extract maximum bribes possible.In other words, they would charge
according to "ability to pay." In equilibrium, firmsthat pay more bribes could still face higher, not
lower, effective red tape.
On empirical ground, Mauro (1995), Hines (1995),Kaufinann(1997a), Tanzi (1997) and Wei3
(1997a)have shown the negative effects of corruption oneconomic growth, business development,
on driving firms to the unofficial economy, onpublic expenditures, and on domesticand foreign
investment.
There is also a substantial non-technical and illuminatingwork on the consequences of corruption,
such as in Klitgaard (1990). Also, Andvig (1991)and, more recently, Bardhan (1997), Rose-
Ackerman (1997), Ades and Di Tella (1997) andTanzi (1999) provide excellent surveys on analytical
and empirical issues related to the economics of corruption.
In this paper we first develop a simple modelthat builds on the insight that bureaucratic
harassment may be endogenous. In addition, themodel also stresses the role of firms' different
commitment ability (not to tolerate certain levelsof bribery request) as a function of their
characteristics. We then turn to some statistical evidence.The empirical literature has generally
employed selective country-level corruption perceptionindex and investigated its consequence on
various measures of economic performances for theoverall economies. This paper uses data from
three firm-level surveys, focusing on the interaction atthe micro-level between the firms and the
public officials.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents amodel which challenges the
"efficient grease" theory. Section 3 describes the data set.Sections 4-6 discuss various empirical
results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. A Simple Model
Our simple model is a Stackleberg game between arent-seeking government official and a
representative firm k. The official moves first tochoose harassment or bureaucratic delay in order to
maximize bribe intake, and the firms which is a price taker movesnext to choose the bribe payment
in order to maximize the after-bribe profit.
We solve for the equilibrium levels of bribe and red tape bybackward induction. Consider first
the problem faced by the firm.4
Firm
Suppose bk is the amount of bribery firmk has to pay to a corruption-prone government official,
and ltkisthe profit the firm would have attained without anyharassment from government officials.
Let hk be the (nominal) harassment that theofficial imposes on the firm, which could be tax
asses sment, fire safety standard onthe book, or the published number of days that a givenlicense
application can take. We make thenominal harassment firm-specific to emphasize that theofficial has
discretion over the actual implementation of a given regulation.In other words, red tape can be
customized (to some extent).
We make a distinction between effective or "real"harassment --thered tape that firm actually
faces after paying a bribe, and the nominal harassment --thered tape announced by the bureaucrat
or "on the book" before the firm paysthe bribe. Let rk be the "real" or effective harassment --thered
tape the firm actually faces after making abribe payment.
-- s(bk)
where s(.) is a function describing how bribe payment helpsto reduce effective harassment. We
assume Sb>0and s1,, <0. In other words, holding the nominal harassment,h, constant, more bribery
leads to lower effective red tape, but there is a decreasingreturns to paying bribes. Notice here that
a narrow version of "efficient grease" hypothesis--ifnominal harassment is constant, then bribery
and effective harassment are negatively correlated --holdsby assumption.
To simplif,r the story, we assume that the pre-bribetyprofit, tk, is predetermined. The
representative firm's objective is to maximize its post-bribeand post-harassment profit, which is given
by
-g(r) k
The first order condition yields an implicit functionthat relates the optimal amount of bribe firm
k would pay (if without any constraint on the maximumbribe) and the nominal rate of harassment,
h:
b k) 11k 'b(t' k) -
15
This defines an optimal bribery schedule:
bk =B(hk)





Inother words, the higher is the nominal harassment, the more bribe the firm finds optimal to give.
The above bribery schedule assumes that the firm has to tolerate anylevel of harassment and give
bribes accordingly. We now consider the more relevant case that everyfirm has an exit option, and
therefore a maximum amount of harassment it is willing to tolerate. Supposeh k denote the
maximum harassment that firm k would tolerate (at which point it isindifferent between exiting or
not). That is, it can commit not to tolerate anything aboveh k because of the characteristics of the
firm, the industry it is in, or the source country it is from.With this commitment, the firm will no




For now, let us assume that the bureaucrat sets the harassment rate, h1, (e.g., tax,license,
regulation and delay) solely for the purpose of extractingbribe payment. Assuming that the
bureaucrat's utility is an increasing ftinction of briber intake, she would choose to impose justenough
harassment to induce the firm to pay the maximum amount of bribeit is willing to tolerate, namely,
bk*! B4(hk*). In equilibrium, the firm would pay exactly bk*.This implies that nominal harassment
and bribery are positively correlated across firms.
That is not the end of the story. We can examine the relationship betweenthe effective rate of
harassment and the bribery in equilibrium,6
drk&Ik —- - sb(bk) dbdb
- o
Therefore,in this model, those firms that pay more bribes not only face highernominal rate of
harassment in equilibrium, but also have to deal with highereffective rate of harassment. This is in
sharp contrast with the "efficient grease" hypothesis.
To sum up, if one allows regulation, tax, and bureaucraticred tape and their discretionary
enforcement to be endogenously chosen by rent-seeking officials,the officials may charge according
to the firms' "ability to pay" by raising the nominalharassment sufficiently. In terms of empirical
prediction, we may observe a positive, rather than a negative,correlation between the "effective" red
tape and bribe in equilibrium across firms.
3. Data
In the empirical part of the paper, we examine the relationshipbetween bribe payment and some
measures of effective bureaucratic harassment. There are many typesof harassment one can think of.
Our primary focus will be a proxy for the (actual) time senior managersof firms have to spend
negotiating with bureaucrats on regulations, but we willalso look at proxies for effective regulatory
burden and extent of regulatory discretion, and the (reported effective)cost of capital as other
measures of effective harassment.
We will explore data from three different surveys: (1) Surveyfor the1997 Global
Competitiveness Report (GCR97 for short), (2) that forthe 1996 Global Competitiveness Report
(GCR96 for short), and (3) that for the 1997 World DevelopmentReport (WDR97 for short).
The two 6CR survey were conducted in late 1995 and 1996, respectively,under the auspices of
the Geneva-based World Economic Forum (WEF) and theHarvard Institute for International7
Development(REID). The 1997 Report surveyed 2827 firms in 58 countries, ofwhich 2381 firms
respond both to the questions on corruption and on time spent byfirm managers with bureaucrats.
The publicly released GCRreportpublishes the country average of the survey responses to all the
survey questions. For our study, we largely usethe unpublished individual firm level responses.
Further, we also use the data from the GCR1996,where 1537 firms (1503 non-missing observations
for the questions of our interest) were surveyed in 48 countries. Both survey instruments differin
terms of some of the questions covered, and we find that for our purposesthere are some relevant
questions in each survey.
The WDR97 survey was conducted by the World Bank in 3866 firms covering 73 countriesin
preparation of its Annual Report in 1997.
There are three main reasons for using these three surveys. First, these surveys have differences
in coverage in terms of countries surveyed and questions asked. For example, the GCR97 survey
covers ten more countries than GCR96, and contains 26 countries notin the WDR97 survey, whereas
the WDR97 survey contains 41 countries that are not covered by GCR97. For a completelist of
country coverages in the three surveys, please see Appendix 1. Second,because some of the key
variables such as corruption are perception-based subjective measures, we would like to seeif our
basic findings can be corroborated across different, independently conducted surveys. Finally, the
characteristics of respondents are different between the GCR surveys and the WDR survey. The
(ICR surveys are distributed among member firms of the World Economic Forum which tend tobe
large, sometimes multinational, firms. The WDR survey, on the other hand, mayhave more medium
and even small sized firms in the sample.
We now turn to an explanation of the key variables we attempt to measure.
Corruption. The (ICR 1997 does not ask directly for the magnitudes of bribe paymentmade by
the respondents. All questions in that survey are on the variable ratings by the respondent in ascale
of 1 to 7. Specifically for corruption the survey asks the respondents, in question 8.02, to ratethe
level of corruption, on a one-to-seven scale, according to the extent of "irregular, additional payments
connected with imports and exports permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments,8
policyprotection or loan applications." To check the reliabilityof this indicator, we correlated the
country means of that variable in the GCR surveywith the corruption rankings in Business
International and Transparency International. The pairwise correlations are0.77 and 0.83,
respectively, indicating a broad agreement on corruption ranking acrosscountries among different
sources. This was similarly the case for the variable ratingcorruption in the GCR1996.
For the empirical work, we make the assumption that individualfirm's rating is correlated with
their individual experience in bribery payment. Hence, firms that give a worse rating ontheir reported
perceived incidence of bribery in the survey do indeedfind themselves in a position to have to pay
more bribes in their business operation. This assumptionwill be maintained for much of the statistical
work. We will discuss the implication of relaxing it later in the paper.
In the WDR97 Private Sector Survey of 3700 firms, Question 14asks: "Is it common for firms
in my line of business to have to pay some irregular, "additional" payments to get thingsdone?" The
respondent is asked to rate corruption on a 1-6 scalewith 1 meaning "always" and 6 "never."
Time spent by managers with bureaucrats. The GCR 1997 survey asksthe respondents, in
Question 2.06, on a one-to-seven scale, whether the "senior managementof your company" spends
more or less than "30% of its time dealing with government bureaucracy."An answer of "4" (in the
scale of 1 to 7) is calibrated to mean the management has spent roughly30% of time. We use answer
to this question to measure the time the management ofthe firm has wasted in dealing with
regulation, negotiating tax relief; and so on. This question was notasked in GCR 1996.
In the WDR97 Private Sector survey, Question 21 asked, "what percentageof senior management
time is spent on negotiation with officials about changes and interpretationsof laws and regulations?
(1) less than 5%, (2) 5-15%, (3) 15-25%, (4) 25-50%, (5) 50-75%,and (6) more than 75%." In our
regressions, we re-code the answer (1) to 2%. From (2) to (5), we usethe midpoint. For (6), we use
80%.
Unpredictability Unpredictability index is based on the answers tothree questions (15, 16 and 17)
in the WDR97 Private Sector Survey. Question 15 asked respondentshow much they agree to the
statement that, "firms in my line of business usually know in advanceabout how much this 'additional9
payment'is." Question 16 was on the extent of agreement with the statement that,"even if a firm
has to make an 'additional payment' it always has to fear that it will beasked for more, e.g., by other
officials." And Question 17 asked the extent of agreement to the statement that,"if a firm pays the
required 'additional payment' the service is usually also delivered as agreed."All three questions were
answered on a one to six scale.
Cost of capital. Only in GCR 1996 there was a question (4.09) whichasked firms to rate in a
scale of 1 to 6 whether the cost of capital was too high/does nothinder competitive business
development. For purposes of comparability with the estimationsof the regressions using the GCR
1997 data we re-scaled this variable to a scale ranging between 1 to 7.
Regulation. We extract two aspects of government regulations fromthe GCR97 survey. The first
• one, which we label as "regulatory burden," is derived from Question 2.02,which asks the
respondents to rate on a one-to-seven basis the degree towhich "government regulations impose a
heavy burden on business competitiveness."
The second one, which we label as "regulatory discretion," is derived from Question 2.08,which
asks the respondents to rate on a one-to-seven scale the degree to which the "government regulations
are vague and lax."
4.Evidencefrom the Firm Surveys for the Global Competitiveness Reports
Using the data from the two GCR surveys, we now examine the empiricalrelationship between
corruption payment and effective bureaucratic harassment. There are many typesof bureaucratic
harassment we can imagine. Many are not in the surveys. We focus as our primary measureof
effective harassment the time cost that the firms' management has to incur with governmentofficial
negotiating interpretations of regulations. The "efficient grease" hypothesiswould suggest a negative
correlation between bribes and the effective wasted time: firms that pay more bribes to buy savings
in terms of the time in getting the officials to certify compliance with the (nominal) regulationsand/or
in securing licenses. That is why many of the "grease payments" are also called "speed money."10
In addition, we will also look into regulatory burden and cost of capital as alternative measures
of the effective harassment.
Let us start with a cross-country comparison between average time wasted and average bribery
tendency, on the basis of the GCR 1997 data. If we regress the country-level measure of timewasted
by senior managers of firms with public officials on a constant and the country-level measureof
bribery2, we obtain a slope coefficient of 0.29 which is statistically significant at the five percent level
(not reported). Therefore, countries that allow corruption and bribery to flourish are, on average,also
those in which the firms in the country waste more, not less, time with government officials haggling
over regulations.
Of course, cross country regressions based on average indices can have serious drawbacks, both
masking the richness of individual observations and also potentially biasing the results. For instance,
there may be differences in country characteristics (e.g., the extent of regulation) that may be
correlated both with corruption and wasted time.
Thus, we turn next to examine if, within a country, there is any association at the firm level
between time-wasted and bribe burden (as measured by firm-specific bribery level). Table 1 reports
on a basic set of regressions of the determinants of time spent by the firm's managementwith public
officials. Column 1 reports the most basic regression without the country fixed effects, based on all
2761 firms in the (1CR 1997 survey. The coefficient (0.33) is positive and statistically significant.
Once we control for the country fixed effects (Column 2), the point coefficient declines to 0.27, but
remains to be positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with our model, but inconsistent
with the "efficient grease" hypothesis.
As a check of robustness, we also look at two alternative measures of effective red tape: the
degree of effective regulatory burden and regulatory discretion from the same survey. Here, we
regard the cross-firm differences in these measures as true differences in regulation that firms
experience. The possibility that the reported difference is just difference in firms' perceptionwill be
examined in a later section.
2A country-level measure of time wasted for a particular country is the equally weighted average of all individual
responses for that countly on the relevant question. The countiy-level measure of briberyis constructed in the same way.
Appendix A reports the country-level measures of bribery from the three surveys.II
Columns 3-6 in Table 1 report regressions with effective regulatory burden and effective
regulatory discretion as the dependent variables, respectively. We see again, there is a clear positive
relationship between bribery and effective red tape the firms face.
In Column 7, we go back to focusing on time wasted as the dependent variable. In addition to
country and sector fixed effects, we also control for the relationship between regulations and bribery,
and we also add two other firm characteristics (whether the firm is large, and whether it is a foreign
investor). There is some evidence that a large or foreign firm, on average, experiences less time
wasted with government officials. Most crucial to our discussion, we see that the coefficient on
bribery declines (relative to Column 2) to 0.17, but remains positive and statistically significant. In
Columns 8 and 9, we perform the regression on two subsamples of countries (those with high average
bribery, and those with high average effective regulatory burden). Again, we see that firms that pay
more bribes, in equilibrium, experience more, not less, time wasted with the officials on matters
related to regulations. Overall, there is no evidence that would support the "efficient grease"
hypothesis.
Asian Exceptionalism?
Some writers have long conjectured that --even if it is shown that overall bribery and corruption
is inimical to growth and business development-- the Asian experience suggest that there is
something special about that region, where in fact the "grease" argument may have had more
currency and validity. One often hears the view that corruption has been part of the Asian culture
for a long time and does not seem to hamper the business there.
We now undertake an explicit examination of the Asian exceptionalism hypothesis. Focusing on
the subsample of the Asian countries, we replicate the key regressions in Table 1 and report the
results in Table 2. We see that bribery is positively correlated with all three measures of effective red
tape. If anything, the slope coefficient tends to be bigger for the Asian subsample than for all
countries together. Thus, the evidence rejects overwhelmingly the Asian exceptionalism hypothesis.
Corruption and Cost-of-Capital
As another check on the relationship between bribery and effective red tape, we now look at a12
measure of (firm-specific) cost of capital from the 1996 GCRsurvey3.Government officials may have
discretionary power over to which firm to allocate subsidized loans and at what terms.The "efficient
grease" hypothesis would suggest that those firms which pay more bribesshould have better access
to cheaper credit and hence have a lower cost of capital. Table 3 presents the regressionsof the cost
of capital on bribery. Column 1 presents a simple regression where corruption is the only regressor
(other than the intercept). The coefficient on bribery is positive and significant.In later columns
where different specifications and subsamples are experimented, we always obtain the same
qualitative result. Therefore, firms that have paid more bribes also have higher, not lower, costof
capital. This is inconsistent with the "efficient grease" hypothesis.
5. Evidence from the Firm Survey for the 1997 World Development Report
The time wasted variable in the GCR97surveyis a qualitative measure. In comparison, the same
variable in the WDR97 survey asks for more precise, quantitative questions. The two surveys are also
different in terms of country coverage and methodology. So, in this section, we examine the link
between bribery and effective red tape based on the data from the WDR97 survey.
Table 4 re-examines the relationship between corruption frequencies and effective red tape. The
first two columns look at the extent of regulatory burden. As in the GCR survey, there is again a
positive correlation between bribery frequency and regulatory burden.
The remaining part of the table reports regressions with time spent with government officials as
the dependent variable. We see that the frequency of corruption and managers' time spent with
officials are positively correlated, just like in the GCR samples. That is, firms that report to have paid
more bribes also have more management time spent negotiating with the bureaucracies,which is
inconsistent with the beneficial grease hypothesis. This is true after we control the country fixed
effects regulatory burden, predictability of bribe transaction, and firm size. The same pattern holds
when we restrict our attention to the subsample of all foreign firms, or all domestic firms (Columns
6 and 7), and to the subsample of countries with relatively high predictability of corruption. Again
3The GCR96surveydidnotask the question on time spent with government officials, whereas the GCR97 survey
did not ask the question on the cost of capital.13
the same pattern appears in the subsample of countries in which bribe payments are high, or in the
sample of Latin American and Caribbeans, and Asian countries (not reported).
6. Possible Perception Bias
A potential problem with the above regression analysis stems from possible survey respondent
perception bias that may be correlated across survey questions. Suppose that firms A and B have to
pay exactly the same amount of bribes, and that their managers have to spend the exactly the same
amount of time with government officials. If the manager in firm A who answers the survey questions
happen to have a bad feeling towards the government, he may give a worse ratings on both corruption
and management time questions. If this happens, we may mistakenly think that the answers from
these firms indicate a positive relationship between bribery and time the managers spend with officials
even though none exists by our initial assumption. Note such perception bias is a potential problem
for many research based on survey responese.
To address this concern, we construct a measure of perception bias at the level of individual
respondents, based on how the respondents rate the quality of arguebly identical public good. We
label our measure as "Kvetch4," after the Yiddish expression for habitual complainer.
Let us start with the GCR97survey.In order to ensure robustness of our subsequent regression
results, we construct three Kvetch measures, using incrementally more questions from the survey.
"Kvetchl" is the deviation of individual respondent's answer to Question 4.01, "overall infrastructure
in your country" is "worse than in your major trading partners," from the average answer from all
respondents in that country. A high number implies a greater tendency to gripe.
"Kvetch2" is an equally-weighted average of the individual answer's deviations from the mean for
Question 4.01 (described above) and Question 4.12 ("government budget neglects infrastructure
investment").
"Kvetch3"is an equally-weighted average of the individual answers from the national mean for
four questions, 4.01 and 4.12 described above, plus 4.09 ("your country suffers from severe power
4According to Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionaiy, Kvetch (a Yiddish word) as a noun means a habitual
complainer. It can also be used as a verb to mean "to complain habitually: GRIPE."14
shortage") and 4.11 ("warehousing, storage facilities, and distribution networks are grossly
inadequate"). Again, a high number imply a greater tendency to gripe.
We include these measures, one by one, in our regressions in order to control for the possibilities
that some respondents are more likely than others to exaggerate how bad government officials are
on every question. The objective is to see if the positive association between the time managers
spend with government officials and perceived corruption level reported early would go away with
this control.
Note that quality of the public goods covered by the Kvetch measures, particularly "Kvetch3,"
may, to some degree, be "customized" for exactly the same reason as our theoretic story. Therefore,
these measures may over-correct the perception bias. In other words, there is a risk that the positive
association between the time managers spend and corruption disappears when the Kvetch measures
are added into the regressions even when the true relationship is positive.
Table 5 reports the regression results. All three kvetch measures have positive coefficients in all
regressions, and eight out of nine of them are statistically significant. Including the Kvetch measures
tend to reduce the point estimates on the bribery coefficient relative to the comparable specifications
without Kvetch (Table 1). This is consistent with the hypothesis that perception bias may be present.
However, even after controlling for the perception bias, the positive correlation between bribery and
effective red tape does not go away.
We implement a similar idea to the WDR samply. First, we also construct three measures of
perception bias which use increasingly more questions from the surveys. "Kvetchl" is an equally
weighted average of the respondent's ratings (on a 1-6 scale with 1 being the best and 6 the poorest)
of the following three public goods: the general condition of roads, the efficiency of mail delivery,
and the quality of public care provision5.
"Kvetch2" is an equally weighted average of the respondent's ratings (all on a 1-6 scale with 1
being the best) of the following four public goods: General rating of the efficiency of government in
delivering services right now (Question 25, Part 1, in the WDR survey), plus the three questions
covered in "Kvetch 1."
"Kvetch3" is equally weighted average of the ratings of six questions: in addition to the four
They are Question 22 b-d, respectively, in the WDR97 survey.15
publicgoods covered in "Kvetch2," we add "frequency of power outages" and "time it takes to get
a public telephone line connected" (Questions 23 and 24, respectively, in the WDRsurvey).
Next, we repeat the key regressions in Table 4 with the three Kvetch measures added one by one.
The regression results are reported in Table 6. As we can see, the Kvetch variables are positively
correlated with the measures of red tape (regulatory burden and the time firm officers have to spend
with government officials), and their inclusion generally reduces the coefficient on the bribery
variable. This suggests that part of the correlation between reported effective red tape and reported
bribery frequency may indeed relate to the Kvetch effect. However, in all cases, the coefficients on
the bribery variable remain positive and statistically significant, suggesting the perception bias due to
differential grumpiness is not the driving reason for our earlier findings.
7. Conclusions and Implications
If bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, bribe payment may help firms to reduce the
effective burden and delay they face. In a more general equilibrium in which regulatory burden and
delay are endogenously chosen by the bureaucrats in order to extract rents, more bribe payment will
not be associated with less delay and lower burden. In a simple model, we show that the contrary
can be true: the bribes firms have to pay and the effective harassment they face in equilibrium can be
positively correlated.
In the second part of the paper, we examine some evidence from three large firm-level surveys,
focusing on the relationship between bribe payment and a variety of measures of offical harassment
(management time wasted with bureaucracy, regulatory burden, and cost of capital). The evidence
suggests that there is no support for the "efficient grease" hypothesis. In fact, a consistent pattern is
that bribery and measures of official harassment are positively correlated across firms.
While the surveys at hand have some clear advantages for our purposes, such as questions asking
thousands of firms throughout the world on the very variables we are honing in, its potential problems
ought to be explicitly taken into account as well. Chief among them is the possible perception bias,
given that the survey does not elicit hard numbers from the respondents but only ratings in an index.
We have proposed and implemented an approach to deal with perception bias and found that the16
resultsare still robust. Future work with a more precise measure of bribery (and other variables)
could helps us obtain more accurate answer.
Just to clariij, this paper does not say that a bribe-paying firm in a corrupt environment is
individually irrational. Rather, it says that the business community as a whole can benefit from
international laws that strengthen their ability to credibly commit to no-bribery even if an individual
firm may find it otherwise optimal to bribe in a corrupt environment,. Such laws not only may reduce
bribe payment, it may actually reduce the harassment firms may face in equilibrium.17
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 Appendix A: Country Coverage and Corruption Ratings
Country Country GCR96 GCR97 WDR97
Code
ALB Albania .. •. 3.7
ARG Argentina 5.7 4.5
ARM Armenia .. .. 3.8
AUS Australia 2.0 2.0
AUT Austria 2.0 1.8 1.9
AZE Azerbaijan .. .. 4.6
BEL Belgium 3.2 2.6
BEN Benin .. .. 4.2
BGR Bulgaria .. .. 4.6
BLR Belarus .. .. 4.2
BOL Bàlivia .. .. 3.5
BRA Brazil 5.1 4.2
CAN Canada 1.5 1.7 1.6
CHE Switzerland 1.8 1.8 1.0
CHL Chile 2.3 2.3
CHN China 5.6 4.1
CIV Coted'Ivoire .. .. 4.1
CMR Cameroon .. .. 4.4
COG Congo .. .. 4.4
COL Colombia 7.0 5.1 2.8
CR1 Costa Rica .. 4.3 3.0
CZE Czech Republic 4.8 3.3 2.8
DEU Germany 2.8 2.0 1.7
DNK Denmark 1.2 1.6
ECU Ecuador .. .. 3.9
EGY Egypt 4.0 2.0
ESP Spain 5.5 2.8 1.9
EST Estonia .. .. 2.2
FIN Finland 1.7 1.3
FJI Fiji .. .. 2.4
FRA France 3.1 2.6 2.5
GBR United Kingdom 1.6 1.5 1.6
GEO Georgia 4.2
GHA Ghana .. .. 3.6
GIN Guinea .. .. 4.4
GNB Guinea-Bissau .. .. 3.1
GRC Greece 4.9 5.0
GTM Guatemala .. 5.4
HKG Hong Kong 2.8 1.8 1.4
HND Honduras 5.4
HUN Hungary 3.9 2.6ION Indonesia 5.9 5.5
IND India 6.2 5.1 4.0
IRL Ireland 2.0 1.9 1.5
ISL Iceland 1.9 4.3
ISR Israel 2.1 2.7
ITA Italy 5.4 4.1 2.8
JAM Jamaica .. .. 2.6
JOR Jordan 3.9 4.5 2.4
JPN Japan 3.1 2.2
KAZ Kazakhstan .. .. 4.3
KEN Kenya .. .. 3.6
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic .. .. 4.1
KOR Korea, South 4.5 4.3 3.1
LTU Lithuania .. .. 3.3
LUX Luxembourg 1.4 1.3
LVA Latvia 3.9
MAR Morocco 3.8
MDA Moldova .. .. 4.2
MDG Madagascar .. .. 4.2
MEX Mexico 6.0 4.4 2.8
MKD Macedonia, Form .. .. 3.1
MLI Mali 3.7
MOZ Mozambique 3.7
MUS Mauritius .. .. 2.9
MWI Malawi .. .. 2.6
MYS Malaysia 4.2 4.0 2.4
NGA Nigeria .. .. 3.2
NIC Nicaragua .. 5.5
NLD Netherlands 1.9 1.8
NOR Norway 1.6 1.4
NZL NewZeatand 1.0 1.8
PER Peru 4.4 3.4 2.9
PHL Philippines 6.2 5.5
POL Poland 3.0 4.6 3.1
PRT Portugal 4.0 2.7 2.7
PRY Paraguay .. .. 3.8
RUS Russia 6.4 5.3 3.8
SEN Senegal .. .. 3.7
SGP Singapore 1.3 1.6 1.5
SLV El Salvador .. 4.5
SVK Slovak Republic .. 3.6 4.1
SWE Sweden 1.8 1.4
TCD Chad 4.0
TGO Togo .. .. 3.5
THA Thailand 5.0 5.5 3.7
TUR Turkey 5.7 4.2 3.2
TWN Taiwan 4.5 3.3
TZA Tanzania 4.2UGA Uganda 3.7
UKR Ukraine .. 4.3 3.4
USA United States 1.4 1.9 2.4
UZB Uzbekistan .. .. 4.4
VEN Venezuela 6.5 5.2 3.7
VNM Vietnam 5.3
WTB West Bank .. .. 2.8
ZAF South Africa 4.6 3.4 1.9
ZMB Zambia 2.8
ZWE Zimbabwe 3.9 2.4
Notes:
(1)GCR96 and GCR97 — surveys conducted by the World Economic Forum and
Harvard Institute for International Development for the 1996 and 1997 Global
Competitiveness Reports, respectively. WDR — survey conducted by the World
Bank for its 1997 World Development Report.
(2) GCR and WDR surveys are on 1-7 and 1-6 scales, respectively. Corruption
rating for a country in this table is the average of all individual responses for that
country. In both original surveys, a low number means more corruption. To
minimize awkwardness in interpretation, we re-scale the ratings so that a high
number means more corruption. For example, GCR rating reported here = 8-
original GCR rating, WDR rating reported here = 7-original WDR rating.